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Quantum physics allows for unconditionally secure communication through insecure communication channels.
The achievable rates of quantum-secured communication are fundamentally limited by the laws of quantum
physics and in particular by the properties of entanglement. For a lossy communication line, this implies
that the secret-key generation rate vanishes at least exponentially with the communication distance. We
show that this fundamental limitation can be violated in a realistic scenario where the eavesdropper can
store quantum information for only a finite, yet arbitrarily long, time. We consider communication through
a lossy bononic channel (modeling linear loss in optical fibers) and we show that it is in principle possible
to achieve a constant rate of key generation of one bit per optical mode over arbitrarily long communication
distances.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises unconditional
secure communication through insecure communication chan-
nels [1]. In real world implementations of QKD, how-
ever, the achievable secret-key rates are still relatively low
compared with standard telecommunication rates. The rates
of secret-key generation are not only constrained by ex-
perimental imperfections, which can be amended in prin-
ciple, but are also limited by the fundamental features
of quantum physics. As recently shown in [2], the en-
tanglement between the two ends of the communication
channel ultimately bounds the maximum rate of secret-key
generation:
R  Esq(N ), (1)
where Esq(N ) is an entropic quantity called the squashed
entanglement of the channel [3], which is a function of the
quantum communication channel N linking the legitimate
sender Alice to the legitimate receiver Bob.
In this paper we consider the case where the communication
channel N is a lossy (and noisy) bosonic channel. This
means that information is encoded in a collection of bosonic
modes whose corresponding canonical operators are denoted
aj , a
†
j and satisfy the commutation relations [aj ′ ,a†j ] =
δjj ′ . In the Heisenberg picture the quantum channel maps
the canonical operators aj , a†j to aj →
√
η aj +
√
1 − η vj ,
a
†
j →
√
η a
†
j +
√
1 − η v†j , where η ∈ [0,1] is the attenua-
tion factor (also called transmissivity) and vj , v†j are the
canonical ladder operators of an environment bosonic mode.
The lossy channel is obtained if the environment mode is
initially in the vacuum state, while the lossy and noisy
channel corresponds to the environment mode being in a
thermal state with NT mean photon number. These channels
attenuate the input power by a factor η and model the
ubiquitous processes of linear absorption and scattering of
light.
When applied to the case of the lossy bosonic
channel, the squashed entanglement bound in (1)
yields [2]1
R  log
(
1 + η
1 − η
)
, (2)
where the rate is measured in bits (throughout this paper
log ≡ log2) per bosonic mode (given the bandwidth of the
channel, this can be easily translated in bits per second). For
both free space and fiber optics communication, the attenuation
factor η = e−/0 scales exponentially with the distance 
between sender and receiver, where the characteristic length
0 depends on experimental conditions. For long distances,
R  η = e−/0 , and the key rate decays at least exponentially
with increasing communication distance. This result marks a
striking difference between quantum-secured communication
and (insecure) classical communication. In the latter case,
one can in principle achieve a finite communication rate over
arbitrarily long distances, just by sufficiently increasing the
signal power [6]. Unfortunately, this is not the case for quantum
communication where a fundamental rate-distance tradeoff
exists, requiring the use of quantum repeaters to perform QKD
on long distances.
It is thus clear that to go around the fundamental rate-
distance tradeoff in (2) one should renounce unconditionally
security. Here we discuss QKD conditioned on the assumption
that technological limitations allow an eavesdropper Eve
to store quantum information reliably only for a known
and finite—but otherwise arbitrarily long—time. Such an
eavesdropper may also have unlimited computational power,
including a quantum computer. Indeed, any physical real-
ization of a quantum memory can reliably store quantum
information only for a time of the order of its coherence time.
We stress that we do not require the legitimate receiver to have
better quantum storage technologies than the eavesdropper. As
1This bound has been now superseded by the results of [4], which
prove a tighter upper bound given by the expression log( 11−η ). Notice
that for small value of η, this bound still vanishes linearly with η.
Since this upper bound coincides with the lower bound previously
proven in [5], it also provides the ultimate capacity for secret key
generation through the lossy bosonic channel.
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will be shown, the legitimate parties could have a much shorter
memory time than the eavesdropper and the communication
will still be secure.
II. SECURITY DEFINITIONS
According to the state of the art, one requires a quantum
cryptography protocol to be unconditionally and composably
secure. Unconditional security means that one does not rely on
unproven statements (e.g, about the complexity of factorizing
large numbers, or in general about the computational power of
the eavesdropper). Composable security means that the given
protocol is secure also when used as a subroutine within an
overarching protocol [7].
Suppose that a given communication protocol aims at
establishing a secret message described as a random variable
X. The information about X in the hands of the eavesdropper
Eve is described, without loss of generality, by a bipartite
quantum state of the form,
ρXE =
∑
x
pX(x) |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρE(x). (3)
Ideally, one would like Eve’s state to be completely uncor-
related with the message X, that is, ρXE = ρX ⊗ ρE [8]. To
quantify the deviation from such an ideal setting one considers
the trace distance [9],
D(ρXE,ρX ⊗ ρE) := 12 ‖ρXE − ρX ⊗ ρE‖1. (4)
Therefore, the security of the communication protocol is
assessed by the condition,
D(ρXE,ρX ⊗ ρE)  , (5)
which implies that the state ρXE is indistinguishable, up to
a probability smaller than , from the state ρX ⊗ ρE , that is,
the given communication protocol is secure up to a probability
smaller than  [10]. As a matter of fact this criterion guarantees
unconditional and composable security [10].
In this paper we renounce unconditional security and seek
security conditioned on the fact that the eavesdropper can store
quantum information only for a finite and known time τ . This
means that Eve is forced to make a measurement within a
time τ after obtaining the quantum state. Suppose that Eve
has made a measurement  described by the positive operator
valued measurement (POVM) elements {y}y [11]. After the
measurement has been made, the state has “collapsed” to
ρ ′XE =
∑
y
TrE(ρXE I⊗ y) |y〉E〈y| (6)
=
∑
x,y
pX(x) Tr(ρE(x)y) |x〉〈x| ⊗ |y〉E〈y|. (7)
Since ρ ′XE is diagonal in the basis {|x〉 ⊗ |y〉}, we have
D(ρ ′XE,ρ ′X ⊗ ρ ′E) =
∑
x,y
|pXY (x,y) − pX(x)pY (y)| (8)
=: D(pXY ,pXpY ), (9)
where pXY (x,y) = pX(x)pY |x(y) with pY |x(y) = Tr(ρE(x)
y) and pY (y) =
∑
x pX(x)pY |x(y), that is, the trace distance
equals the distance between classical probabilities. Finally,
optimizing over Eve’s choice of her measurement, we obtain
the following security condition:
sup

D(pXY ,pXpY )  . (10)
In this paper, instead of working directly with condi-
tion (10), we require
Iacc(X;E)ρ  ′, (11)
where Iacc(X;E)ρ denotes the accessible information of Eve
about X given the state ρXE [12]. The latter implies condi-
tion (10), for  = √2 ln (2) ′, via Pinsker inequality [13],
max

D(pXY ,pXpY ) 
√
2 ln (2) Iacc(X;E)ρ. (12)
It is worth recalling that accessible information was used
as a security quantifier during the first years of quantum
cryptography, since it was found that a security criterion based
on the accessible information does not in general guarantee
composable security in an unconditional manner [10]. Here
instead we have shown that composability holds under
condition (10) if we give up full unconditional security and
seek security under the assumption that the eavesdropper can
store quantum information only for a finite and known time—
i.e, she has a quantum memory with limited storage time.
III. SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS
We present two novel key-generation protocols for
continuous-variable quantum optical communication through
a lossy bosonic channel with transmissivity η, modeling linear
attenuation and scattering. These protocols are composably se-
cure under the condition that Eve’s has a quantum memory with
finite, and known, but otherwise arbitrarily long, storage time.
The first protocol is a direct-reconciliation protocol (in
which we allow information reconciliation by forward public
communication from the sender Alice to the receiver Bob). We
obtain a simple formula for the asymptotic key rate (see Fig. 1):
rdr = 1 + log
(
η
1 − η
)
. (13)
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Achievable key rate for the pure loss
channel (NT = 0) vs the channel transmissivity η, in bits per mode,
for direct reconciliation protocols. (Blue solid line) Achievable
locked-key rate as given by the expression in (13). (Red dashed line)
Maximum fully unconditional secret-key rate, given by the expression
max{0, log ( η1−η )} [14].
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Achievable key rate for the pure loss
channel (NT = 0) vs the channel transmissivity η, in bits per mode,
for reverse reconciliation protocols. (Blue solid line) Achievable
locked-key rate as from the expression in (14). (Red dashed line)
Upper bound for the secret-key rate (assisted by two-way public
communication), given by the expression in (2). (Yellow dash-dotted
line) Achievable asymptotic secret-key rate according to the standard
security definition as given by the reverse coherence information
log ( 11−η ) [5].
This protocol can generate a nonzero key rate for any η > 1/3.
By comparison, the maximum unconditionally secure key rate
from direct reconciliation is given by the quantum capacity
formula log ( η1−η ) [14] and is positive only for η > 1/2 [15].
The second protocol is a reverse-reconciliation protocol
(we allow information reconciliation by backward public
communication from Bob to Alice). In this setting we show that
Alice and Bob can in principle generate key at an asymptotic
rate of more than 1 bit per bosonic mode sent through the
channel. This is true for any nonzero value of the transmissivity
η, provided sufficient input energy is provided—hence repro-
ducing the feature of insecure classical communication in a
quantum-secured communication framework. The achievable
asymptotic key rate is (see Fig. 2)
rrr = 1 + log
(
1
1 − η
)
. (14)
By comparison, the maximum fully unconditional key rate is
upper bounded by the expression in (2) and vanishes linearly
with η.
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Tolerable excess noise NT vs the transmis-
sivity η for the reverse-reconciliation quantum data locking protocol,
from Eq. (15). The asymptotic locked-key generation rate is nonzero
for values of (η,NT ) below the curve.
We also consider the case of lossy and noisy bosonic
channel, which models the presence of experimental imper-
fection or a thermal-like background with NT mean photons
per mode. The lossy and noisy channel is also used to model
an “active attack” from the eavesdropper, who injects noise in
the channel. In this case we obtain an asymptotic rate equal to
rrr = 1 + log
(
1
1 − η
)
− g(NT ), (15)
which is nonzero at arbitrary distances provided NT  0.3
(see Fig. 3) [the function g is defined in Eq. (20)].
These protocols are instances of quantum data locking
protocols (see Sec. V). We henceforth call locked key a key
which is generated by a quantum data locking protocol, just to
remind us that this key is not unconditionally secure, but secure
conditioned on the assumption of finite memory storage time.
IV. COMPARISON WITH OTHER MODELS
It is known that high rates of secret-key generation can be
attained against an eavesdropper endowed with an imperfect
quantum memory, as, for example, in the bounded storage
model, where Eve can store only a constrained number of
qubits (see, e.g., [16]). Even under bounded storage, no known
protocol attains a constant rate as a function of distance.
Elsewhere we have shown that quantum data locking allows
for a substantial enhancement of the key rate [17,18]. Here we
show for the first time that such an assumption allows us to
generate key at a constant rate across virtually any distance. It
is an open question whether the quantum data locking could
be applied in the bounded storage model to attain rates of key
generation independent on the distance.
Our results must be compared with the bounds on the
optimal secret-key rate obtained requiring fully unconditional
security. In the asymptotic setting, the security is usually
quantified by the quantum mutual information (see, e.g., [19]).
The gain in key generation rate that we achieve follows
from the existence of a large gap between the quantum
mutual information and the accessible information of the
adversary. This gap is well known in quantum information
theory: It is the quantum discord [20], which quantifies the
quantum correlations that the adversary cannot access by local
measurements on her share of the quantum system.
V. QUANTUM DATA LOCKING AND QUANTUM
ENIGMA MACHINES
In a typical quantum data locking protocol [21–24], the two
legitimate parties, say Alice and Bob, publicly agree on a set
of MK quantum codewords. They then use a preshared secret
key of logK bits, labeled by s = 1,2, . . . ,K , to secretly agree
on a set of M (equally probable) codewords, labeled by x =
1,2, . . . ,M , used to encode logM bits of classical information.
These quantum codewords are sent through n uses of a
quantum channel from Alice to Bob. Suppose an eavesdropper
Eve tampers with the communication line and obtains one of
the states ρnE(x,s). The correlations between Eve’s quantum
system and the input message x are described by the state,
ρnXE =
1
M
M∑
x=1
|x〉〈x| ⊗ 1
K
K∑
s=1
ρnE(x,s), (16)
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where {|x〉}x=1,...,M is an orthonormal basis for an auxiliary
quantum system encoding the messages x—notice that the
summation over s comes from the fact that Eve does not
know the value of the secret key. One can prove that, if
the states ρnE(x,s) have a suitable form and for K large
enough, Eve can only obtain a negligible amount of the
classical information—as quantified by the accessible
information—carried by the label x.
In the most powerful quantum data locking schemes known
up to now, a constant-size preshared secret seed of about
logK = log 1/ bits allows Alice and Bob to encrypt logM
bits (with M arbitrarily large), with the guarantee that Eve’s
accessible information is of the order of  logM bits [25–27].
It is worth remarking that quantum data locking provides
the strongest violations of classical information theory in
the quantum setting. Indeed, according to a famous theorem
of Shannon’s, which assesses the security of one-time pad
encryption, to encrypt m bits of classical information Alice
and Bob need at least m bits of preshared secret key [28].
Quantum data locking violates this Shannon’s result by an
exponential amount.
A quantum data locking protocol can be seen as a quantum
counterpart of the twentieth century Enigma machine [29].
Following [29,30] we call “quantum enigma machine” an
optical cipher that harnesses the quantum data locking effect.
Quantum bootstrapping
The first works on quantum data locking focused on the
ideal case of a noiseless communication. Only recently the
quantum data locking effect has been considered in a noisy
setting [29–31] (see also [32]). Here we combine quantum
data locking with a key-recycling technique that has been
successfully applied to quantum data locking in a noisy
communication scenario [17,21,33].
We assume that the eavesdropper Eve and the legitimate
receiver can store quantum information for a time τE and τB ,
respectively.
Suppose then that Alice and Bob, using the quantum
channel n times, run a quantum data locking protocol to
communicate logM = nχ bits of classical information, and
consume logK = nk bits of preshared secret key. Bob may
need to perform a collective measurement over n quantum
systems in order to decode. Since, as from our assumption,
Bob’s quantum memory can store quantum information only
for times shorter than τB , this requires that the n quantum
signals should be sent within this time interval (this is always
possible for τB large enough or by increasing the repetition
rate).
On the other hand, if Eve has a quantum memory with finite
coherence time τE , this implies that she is forced to measure
within a time τE after receiving the signals, otherwise her
memory will decohere anyway. Therefore, what the legitimate
parties Alice and Bob can do is to wait for a time longer than τE
before sending more information through the channel. After
waiting such a time, Alice and Bob can safely recycle part
of the obtained key as a fresh key to run another round of
quantum data locking.
Thus, for χ > k, Alice and Bob can recycle part of the
newly established key and use it as a seed for another round of
quantum data locking. By repeating this procedure many times
they will asymptotically obtain an overall locked-key rate of
r = χ − k bits per channel use, with a negligible amount of
initially shared secret key.
While r = χ − k is the rate of bits per channel use, one
could expect a lower rate in terms of bits per second, due to
the waiting times between quantum data locking subroutines.
There is a simple strategy to solve this problem: Alice and
Bob can use the dead times to run two (or more) independent
quantum data locking protocols. In this way they can in
principle achieve a rate of bits per second as high as rν =
(χ − k)ν, where ν is the number of channel uses per second.
Notice that this holds for any value of τE , as long as it is known
to Alice and Bob, and independently of τB (for instance, we
can take τB = τE or even τB < τE).
VI. THE DIRECT RECONCILIATION PROTOCOL
Alice prepares multimode coherent states that encode both
the input message x ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and the value of the secret
seeds s ∈ {1, . . . ,K} she shares with Bob. The encoding is by
a random code (whose codebook is public) that assigns to each
pair (x,s) an n-mode coherent state,
|αn(x,s)〉 =
n⊗
j=1
|αj (x,s)〉, (17)
where αj (x,s) is the amplitude of the coherent state of the j th
bosonic mode sent through the channel. This is schematically
depicted in Fig. 4, where the lossy channel is represented as a
beam splitter. To construct the random code, the amplitudes of
the coherent states are independently drawn from a circularly
symmetric Gaussian distribution, denoted G(0,N), with zero
mean and mean photon number
∫
d2α |α|2 G(0,N) = N .
The receiver Bob obtains the attenuated coherent states,
|√η αn(x,s)〉 =
n⊗
j=1
|√η αj (x,s)〉. (18)
The goal of Bob, who knows the value of s, is to decode x. It
is known that he can do that (with asymptotically negligible
error) with an asymptotic bit rate for x given by [6]
χdr := lim
n→∞
logM
n
= g(ηN ), (19)
where
g(N ) = (N + 1) log (N + 1) − N logN. (20)
FIG. 4. (Color online) The lossy bosonic channel can be modeled
as a beam splitter with transmissivity η and the environment mode
initially in the vacuum state. In the direct reconciliation protocol,
Alice sends coherent state down the channel.
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To guarantee the security of the communication protocol,
we have to bound Eve’s accessible information. For any x and
s, Eve obtains the attenuated coherent states,
|
√
1 − η αn(x,s)〉 =
n⊗
j=1
|
√
1 − η αj (x,s)〉. (21)
We can show (see Sec. VIII) that Eve’s accessible information
about Alice’s input message x is negligibly small, provided
Alice and Bob initially share enough bits of secret key. For N
large enough, and asymptotically in n, this is achieved for
kdr := lim
n→∞
logK
n
= 2g[(1 − η)N ] − g[2(1 − η)N ]. (22)
Applying the key-bootstrapping routine (see Sec. V A), this
yields a net asymptotic locked-key generation rate of
rdr = χdr − kdr = g(ηN ) − 2g[(1 − η)N ] + g[2(1 − η)N ],
(23)
which in the limit of N → ∞ becomes
rdr = 1 + log
(
η
1 − η
)
. (24)
VII. THE REVERSE RECONCILIATION PROTOCOL
In the first phase of the protocol Alice prepares n instances
of a two-mode squeezed vacuum state, with N mean photons
per mode, that is, ρnAA′ = ρ⊗nAA′ with
ρAA′ = |ζN 〉AA′ 〈ζN |, (25)
and
|ζN 〉AA′ = 1√
N + 1
∞∑
=0
(
N
N + 1
)/2
|〉A|〉A′, (26)
where |〉 denotes the photon-number state with  photons.
Alice keeps the modes labeled with “A” and sends through n
uses of a lossy bosonic channel those labeled with “A′”; see
Fig. 5. At the end of this first phase of the communication
protocol, Alice, Bob, and Eve share the 3n-mode state ρnABE =
ρ⊗nABE, where ρABE is a three-mode Gaussian state with zero
mean and covariance matrix VABE (whose explicit form is
given in Appendix B).
In the second phase of the communication protocol, Bob
makes a collective measurement on his share of n bosonic
modes, described by the state ρnB = ρ⊗nB , where ρB is a Gaus-
sian state with zero mean and variance VB (see Appendix B for
FIG. 5. (Color online) The lossy bosonic channel can be modeled
as a beam splitter with transmissivity η and the environment mode
initially in the vacuum state. In the first phase of the reverse
reconciliation protocol, Alice sends one mode of a two-mode
entangled state (denoted by the symbol “∞”) down the channel.
details). Indeed, Bob applies a measurement (s) chosen from
a set of measurements parametrized by the label s = 1, . . . ,K .
The value of s is determined by the secret key he shares with
Alice. That is, while the list of possible K measurement is
public and hence known to Eve, the specific choice of (s) is
known only by Alice and Bob.
Bob’s measurement is defined as follows. First, Alice and
Bob publicly agree on a set of MK n-mode coherent states,
|βn(x,s)〉 =
n⊗
j=1
|βj (x,s)〉, (27)
for x = 1, . . . ,M and s = 1, . . . ,K . These coherent states
are defined by sampling the amplitudes βj (x,s) independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) from a circularly symmetric
Gaussian distribution with zero mean and variance ηN . For
any given s, we consider the sliced operator,
(s) =
M∑
x=1
PnB |βn(x,s)〉〈βn(x,s)|PnB, (28)
where PnB is the projector on the strongly δ-typical subspace
defined by ρ⊗nB (see, e.g., [34]). Applying the operator
Chernoff bound (see Appendix B for details) we obtain that
the bounds,
(1 − )M2−ng(ηN)PnB  (s)  (1 + )M2−ng(ηN)PnB, (29)
hold true with arbitrarily high probability provided
M  2ng(ηN). It follows that for any given s the operators,
x(s) = P
n
B |βn(x,s)〉〈βn(x,s)|PnB
(1 + )M2−ng(ηN) , (30)
define a subnormalized POVM in Bob’s typical subspace,
which can be completed by introducing the operator 0(s) =
PnB −
∑
x x(s). In this way we have defined Bob’s measure-
ment (s) for all values of s. After performing the measure-
ment, Bob declares an error if he obtains the measurement
output corresponding to 0(s). This event, however, happens
with a negligible probability (see Appendix B for details).
In the third phase of the protocol, Alice makes a mea-
surement on her share of bosonic modes. For a given value
of s (which is known to Alice and Bob) and x, we consider
Alice’s conditional state ρnA(x,s). As a matter of fact, Bob’s
measurement induces a virtual backward communication
channel from Bob to Alice. As a result, for given s, Alice
obtains an ensemble of states {ρnA(x,s),p(x,s)}x=1,...,M , where
p(x,s) = Tr(x(s)ρnB(s)). The maximum amount of classical
information (per mode) about x that Alice can extract from
this ensemble of states is given, in the asymptotic setting, by
the associated Holevo information [35,36]:
χrr = 1
n
[
S
(
ρnA
)−∑
x
p(x,s)S(ρnA(x,s))
]
, (31)
whereS(ρ) = −Tr(ρ log ρ) denotes the von Neumann entropy.
From the explicit expressions for p(x,s), ρnA(x,s), and ρnA
(given in Appendix B) we obtain
χrr = g(N ) − g[(1 − η)N ′], (32)
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where N ′ = N/(1 + ηN ). χrr also quantifies the rate (in bits
per mode) of shared randomness that can be established, with
the assistance of public communication, by Alice and Bob [37].
Finally, to show the security of the communication protocol,
we need to bound Eve’s accessible information about x.
Bob’s measurement also induces a virtual quantum channel
to Eve. For any given s, the ensemble of states obtained by
Eve is {ρnE(x,s),p(x,s)}x=1,...,M , where ρnE(x,s) is Eve’s state
conditioned on Bob’s measurement result x. Given the explicit
form of ρnE(x,s) we show (see Sec. VIII and Appendix B) that
Eve’s accessible information about x is negligibly small for K
such that
krr := lim
n
logK
n
(33)
= 2g[(1 − η)N ] − g[(1 − η)N ′] − g[(1 − η)N ′′], (34)
with N ′′ = N (1 + 2ηN )/(1 + ηN ). In conclusion, applying
the bootstrapping routine, we obtain a net rate of locked-key
generation of (in bits per mode)
rrr = χrr − krr = g(N ) − 2g[(1 − η)N ] + g[(1 − η)N ′′],
(35)
which in the limit of N → ∞ reads
rrr = 1 + log
(
1
1 − η
)
. (36)
Similar results are obtained if the channel from Alice to
Bob is lossy and noisy. In this case the reverse reconciliation
protocol achieves an asymptotic locked-key rate of
rrr = 1 + log
(
1
1 − η
)
− g(NT ), (37)
where NT is the mean number of thermal photons per mode in
the channel.
VIII. SECURITY PROOFS
We discuss in details the case of the lossy channel. The
proof for the lossy and noisy channel can be obtained in a
similar way.
The starting point of the proof are some mathematical tools
presented in [18]. There we assumed that Eve’s states ρnE(x,s)
belong to a finite-dimensional space of dimension dn. Given
the bipartite state,
ρnXE =
1
M
M∑
x=1
|x〉〈x| ⊗ 1
K
K∑
s=1
ρnE(x,s), (38)
the following bound hold for the associated accessible infor-
mation (see [18]):
Iacc  logM − d
n
M
min
|φ〉
{
H [Q(φ)] − η
[
M∑
x=1
Qx(φ)
]}
, (39)
where
Qx(φ) = 1
K
K∑
s=1
〈φ|ρnE(x,s)|φ〉, (40)
H [Q(φ)] = ∑Mx=1 η(Qx(φ)), with η(·) = −(·) log (·). The
minimum is over all vectors φ in Eve’s dn-dimensional Hilbert
space.
As shown in [18], if the ensemble of states from which the
code words are sampled is such that for any unit vector |φ〉,
μ := Es
[〈φ|ρnE(x,s)|φ〉] = 1dn (41)
(Es denotes the expectation value over s), and
 := Es
[〈φ|ρnE(x,s)|φ〉2]
= Es
[〈φ,φ|ρnE(x,s) ⊗ ρnE(x,s)|φ,φ〉] (42)
(here |φ,φ〉 ≡ |φ〉 ⊗ |φ〉), then the right-hand side of (39) is
smaller than  logM provided that
K > max
{
2γ n
(
1
2
lnM + 2
3
ln
5

)
,
dn
M
4 ln 2 ln dn
2
}
, (43)
with
γ n = 
μ2
. (44)
In our setting n counts the number of modes employed
in one quantum data locking routine. Putting M = 2nχ and
 = e−nc with c ∈ (0,1), condition (43) yields an asymptotic
rate of secret-key consumption (in bits per mode),
k = lim
n→∞
1
n
logK = max{log γ, log d − χ}. (45)
In our continuous-variable setting, Eve’s space is infinite
dimensional. Therefore, to apply the result of [18] we need to
map Eve’s space into a finite dimensional one. In both the direct
and reverse reconciliation protocol, the expectation value over
s of the state of Eve has the form (see details in Appendix A
and B),
ρnE = Es
[
ρnE(x,s)
] = ρ⊗nE , (46)
that is, the average state is a direct product. In particular,
ρE is a Gaussian state with zero mean, variance VE , and
mean photon number (1 − η)N . We can hence consider the
δ-typical subspace projector Pnρ associated with ρ⊗nE . We use
this projector to define an auxiliary bipartite state of the form,
σnXE =
1
M
M∑
x=1
|x〉〈x| ⊗ 1
K
K∑
s=1
σnE(x,s), (47)
where
σnE(x,s) = Pnρ ρnE(x,s)Pnρ (48)
is obtained by slicing with the δ-typical subspace projector.
From the properties of the typical projector we have∥∥σnXE − ρnXE∥∥1  δ. (49)
Since the two states are δ close in trace norm, the security
of the state ρnXE follows, up to a probability δ, from that of
σnXE . In such a way we have reduced the problem to a finite
dimensional one, where the dimension is that of the δ-typical
subspace, i.e.,
dn := Tr(Pnρ ) ∈ [2n[S(ρE )−cδ],2n[S(ρE )+cδ]] (50)
(for some constant c).
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We use a notion of typical subspace that is slightly different
from the one usually considered (see, for instance, [34]). Given
a Hermitian operator ξ we consider its spectral decomposition,
ξ =
∑

p P, (51)
where the sum is over the eigenvaluesp and the corresponding
eigenprojectors P, in such a way that p = p′ for  = ′
[that is, Tr(P) equals the degeneracy of p]. We look at each
projector P as an event whose probability is π = p Tr(P).
Given ξ⊗n, we then define the δ-typical projector Pnξ as (we
omit the subscript δ to simplify the notation)
Pnξ =
∑
p1p2 ···pn∈T nδ
P1 ⊗ P2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Pn, (52)
where the sum is over the sequences p1p2 · · ·pn which are
δ typical with respect to the probability distribution π. Notice
that this construction of the typical projector coincides with
the usual one when all the eigenvalues of ξ are nondegenerate.
First we compute (41)
μ = Es
[〈φ| σnE(x,s) |φ〉] (53)
= Es
[〈φ|Pnρ ρnE(x,s)Pnρ |φ〉] (54)
= 〈φ|Pnρ ρ⊗nE Pnρ |φ〉. (55)
Then, from the equipartition properties of the δ-typical
subspace we have (for some constant c)
2−n[S(ρE )+cδ]  μ  2−n[S(ρE )−cδ]. (56)
To compute (42) we need to introduce another typical
subspace projector. We consider the state (ρE ⊗ ρE)⊗n and its
associated (2δ)-typical subspace projector, denoted as Pnρ⊗ρ .
Notice that [Pnρ ⊗ Pnρ,Pnρ⊗ρ] = 0, and that Pnρ ⊗ Pnρ  Pnρ⊗ρ .
We also consider the state,
ρn2E := Es
[
ρnE(x,s) ⊗ ρnE(x,s)
] = ρ⊗n2E . (57)
By explicit computation (see Appendices A and B) we can
show that, in both the direct and reverse reconciliation proto-
cols, ρ2E is a Gaussian state with zero mean and covariance
matrix V2E . Moreover, ρ2E commutes with ρE ⊗ ρE since they
are both diagonal in the photon-number basis (see Appendices
A and B). It follows thatρ2E also commutes withPnρ⊗ρ . We also
have that, given that ρE has mean photon number (1 − η)N ,
then both ρ2E and ρE ⊗ ρE have 2(1 − η)N mean photons.
We can now compute (42)
 = Es
[〈φ,φ| σnE(x,s) ⊗ σnE(x,s) |φ,φ〉] (58)
= Es
[〈φ,φ|Pnρ ⊗2 ρnE(x,s) ⊗ ρnE(x,s)Pnρ ⊗2 |φ,φ〉] (59)
= 〈φ,φ|Pnρ ⊗2 ρ⊗n2E Pnρ ⊗2 |φ,φ〉. (60)
Since Pnρ⊗2 commutes with Pnρ⊗ρ and Pnρ⊗2  Pnρ⊗ρ , we have
  〈φ,φ|Pnρ⊗ρ ρ⊗n2E Pnρ⊗ρ |φ,φ〉. (61)
To conclude, let us consider the sliced operator
Pnρ⊗ρ ρ
⊗n
2E P
n
ρ⊗ρ . Since [Pnρ⊗ρ,ρ⊗n2E ] = 0 we can apply a classi-
cal argument concerning typical type classes (see, e.g., [38]).
Let us denote as q the eigenvalues of ρ2E . We notice that the
eigenvectors of Pnρ⊗ρ ρ
⊗n
2E P
n
ρ⊗ρ are those of ρ
⊗n
2E which are in
the range of Pnρ⊗ρ [that is, they are δ typical for (ρE ⊗ ρE)⊗n].
Consider then an eigenvector whose δ-typical type is π˜ , the
corresponding eigenvalue of Pnρ⊗ρ ρ
⊗n
2E P
n
ρ⊗ρ is
w =
∏

q
nπ˜
 = 2n
∑
 π˜ log q . (62)
Being ρ2E a zero-mean, thermal-like, Gaussian state,
q = Z−12−β, where  is the photon number. This yields
w = 2−n(β〈〉π˜+logZ) (63)
= 2−n(β2(1−η)N+log Z+β〈〉) (64)
= 2−n(S(ρ2E )+β〈〉). (65)
Here 〈〉π˜ =
∑
 π˜ is the mean photon number given by the
δ-typical distribution π˜ . Since π˜ is δ typical for (ρE ⊗ ρE)⊗n,
we expect 〈〉π˜ = 2(1 − η)N , 〈〉 = 〈〉π˜ − 2(1 − η)N be-
ing the fluctuation about the expectation value. Finally we have
used S(ρ2E) = β2(1 − η)N + logZ. In Appendix C we show
that, for a δ-typical type π˜ ,
|β〈〉|  2cδ[(1 − η)N + 1] (66)
(for some constant c), from which we obtain
w  2−n(S(ρ2E )+2cδ[(1−η)N+1]), (67)
and hence
  2−n(S(ρ2E )+2cδ[(1−η)N+1]). (68)
From these results, in the limits that n → ∞ and δ → 0,
we obtain the following bound on the key consumption rate:
k = max{2S(ρE) − S(ρ2E),S(ρE) − χ}. (69)
For the direct reconciliation protocol we have (see deriva-
tion in Appendix A) χ = g(ηN ), S(ρE) = g((1 − η)N ), and
S(ρ2E) = g(2(1 − η)N ). For any given η > 0 and N large
enough we then obtain
k = 2S(ρE) − S(ρ2E) = 2g[(1 − η)N ] − g[2(1 − η)N ].
(70)
For the reverse reconciliation protocol we have (see
Appendix B) χ = g(N ) − g((1 − η)N ′), with N ′ = N/(1 +
ηN ), S(ρE) = g((1 − η)N ), and S(ρ2E) = g((1 − η)N ′) +
g((1 − η)N ′′), with N ′′ = N (1 + 2ηN )/(1 + ηN ). For any
given η > 0 and N large enough we then obtain
k = 2S(ρE) − S(ρ2E) (71)
= 2g[(1 − η)N ] − g[(1 − η)N ′] − g[(1 − η)N ′′]. (72)
IX. CONCLUSION
Quantum cryptography promises unconditionally secure
communication through insecure communication channels.
However, fundamental properties of quantum entanglement
bound the ultimate secret-key generation rates that can be
achieved through a communication channel [2]. For the rele-
vant case of a lossy communication line, as, e.g., free space of
fiber optics communication, the bound of [2] implies that the
secret-key generation rate must decrease at least exponentially
with increasing communication distance.
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Here we have analyzed the rate-distance tradeoff under the
realistic assumption that one can store quantum information
reliably only for a finite time. Clearly, any quantum memory
device can store quantum information only for a time of the
order of its coherence time. We have shown that for any given
finite, yet arbitrarily long, storage time, the quantum data
locking effect can be applied to generate key at a constant
rate over arbitrarily long distances through an optical channel
with linear loss. Moreover, we have shown that this result
holds also in the presence of moderate noise or experimental
imperfections modeled as a thermal background.
It remains an open problem to show that these high rates of
key generation can be achieved in practice. One major problem
is to find a decoding measurement that can be experimentally
realized with current technologies and still allows us to achieve
a constant key rate over long communication distances. If this
question will find a positive answer, our results could pave the
way to a new family of QKD protocols that yield a constant
key rate that does not decay with increasing communication
distance. This would also imply that long-distance quantum
communication can be in principle realized without employing
quantum repeaters.
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APPENDIX A: THE DIRECT
RECONCILIATION PROTOCOL
In the direct reconciliation protocol, the n-mode code words
obtained by Eve read
ρnE(x,s) = |
√
1 − η αn(x,s)〉〈
√
1 − η αn(x,s)|, (A1)
where |√1 − η αn(x,s)〉 = ⊗nj=1|
√
1 − η αj (x,s)〉 is an n-
mode coherent state, where the amplitudes αj (x,s)’s are
sampled i.i.d. from a circularly symmetric Gaussian distri-
bution G(0,N) = 12πN e−|α|
2/N with zero mean and variance N .
Therefore the expectation value over s of ρnE(x,s) reads
Es
[
ρnE(x,s)
] = (∫ dμ|√1 − η α〉〈√1 − η α|)⊗n (A2)
= ρ⊗nE , (A3)
where dμ = d2α G(0,N)(α), and ρE is a single-mode thermal
state with mean photon number (1 − η)N . The spectral
decomposition of ρE is
ρE = 1(1 − η)N + 1
∞∑
=0
( (1 − η)N
(1 − η)N + 1
)
|〉〈|, (A4)
where |〉 is the -photon state. The von Neumann entropy of
ρE is
S(ρE) = g((1 − η)N ). (A5)
Therefore, denoting as Pnρ the δ-typical projector associated
with ρnE we have (for some constant c) (see, e.g., [34])
2n[g((1−η)N)−cδ]  Tr
(
Pnρ
)
 2n[g((1−η)N)+cδ], (A6)
and
2−n[g((1−η)N)+cδ]Pnρ  Pnρ ρnE Pnρ  2−n[g((1−η)N)−cδ]Pnρ . (A7)
Consider the operator ρ⊗2E . This is a two-mode thermal state
with 2(1 − η)N mean photons. Its spectral decomposition can
be obtained from (A4)
ρ⊗2E =
(
1
(1 − η)N + 1
)2 ∞∑
=0
( (1 − η)N
(1 − η)N + 1
)
P, (A8)
where P denotes the projector on the subspace with  photons.
The -photon subspace is generated by the  + 1 two-mode
vectors {|0〉|〉,|1〉|−1〉, . . . |〉|0〉}, therefore Tr(P) = + 1.
Let us now consider the expectation value over s of the
operator ρnE(x,s) ⊗ ρnE(x,s):
Es
[
ρnE(x,s) ⊗ ρnE(x,s)
]
=
(∫
dμ|
√
1 − ηα〉〈
√
1 − ηα| ⊗ |
√
1 − ηα〉〈
√
1 − ηα|
)⊗n
(A9)
= ρ⊗n2E . (A10)
The stateρ2E is a Gaussian state with zero mean and 2(1 − η)N
mean photons. Its spectral decomposition is
ρ2E = 12(1 − η)N + 1
∞∑
=0
(
2(1 − η)N
2(1 − η)N + 1
)
|ψ+ 〉〈ψ+ |,
(A11)
where
|ψ+ 〉 = 2−/2
∑
i=0
√(

i
)
|i〉| − i〉. (A12)
From this we compute the von Neumann entropy of ρ2E :
S(ρ2E) = g(2(1 − η)N ). (A13)
Finally, since |ψ〉 is an -photon state, we obtain that ρ2E com-
mutes with ρE ⊗ ρE , which also implies that [ρ⊗n2E ,Pnρ⊗ρ] = 0.
APPENDIX B: THE REVERSE
RECONCILIATION PROTOCOL
1. Bob’s measurement
We recall the statement of the operator Chernoff bound [39].
Let {ξt }t=1,...,T be a collection of i.i.d. operator-valued random
variables, where each ξt is a positive Hermitian operator in a
Hilbert space of dimension D, satisfying ξt  I and with mean
value E[ξt ] = μ  aI for some a ∈ (0,1). Then for any  > 0
(and provided that (1 + )μ < 1) we have
Pr
{
1
T
T∑
t=1
ξt  (1 + )μ
}
 D exp
(
−T 
2a
4 ln 2
)
, (B1)
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and
Pr
{
1
T
T∑
t=1
ξt  (1 − )μ
}
 D exp
(
−T 
2a
4 ln 2
)
. (B2)
To define Bob’s POVM we apply this bound to the
operators,
ξ (x,s) = PnB |βn(x,s)〉〈βn(x,s)|PnB, (B3)
where PnB is the projector on Bob’s typical subspace. For
any given s, we have a collection {ξ (x,s)}x=1,...,M of M
i.i.d. operator-valued random variables, with ξ (x,s)  PnB , and
E[ξ (x,s)]  2−n[g(ηN)+cδ]PnB . Hence by restricting to Bob’s
typical subspace, we meet the conditions for applying the
operator Chernoff bound with a = 2−n[g(ηN)+cδ]. It follows
from (B1) that for any s, the operator,
(s) =
M∑
x=1
PnB |βn(x,s)〉〈βn(x,s)|PnB, (B4)
satisfies (s)  M(1 + )2−n[g(ηN)+cδ]PnB with arbitrary high
probability if M  2−n[g(ηN)+cδ]. This in turn implies that the
operators,
x(s) = P
n
B |βn(x,s)〉〈βn(x,s)|PnB
(1 + )M2−n[g(ηN)+cδ] , (B5)
define a subnormalized POVM, that is,
∑
x x(s)  I (here
the identity is intended as the identity operator in the typical
subspace).
To complete the subnormalized POVM we introduce the
operator
0(s) = I−
∑
x
0(s). (B6)
However, that the probability associated with the POVM
element 0(s) is negligibly small. Applying (B2) we obtain
∑
x
x(s)  1 − 1 +   1 − 
2, (B7)
from which it follows 0(s)  2.
2. Alice’s and Eve’s conditional states
For the reverse reconciliation protocol it is easier to work
in the Wigner function representation.
In the first phase of the reverse reconciliation protocol the
tripartite state ρnABE = ρ⊗nABE is broadcast by Alice through the
quantum channel. ρ⊗nABE is the tensor product of n three-mode
zero-mean Guassian states (for a review on Gaussian states
see, e.g., [40]). The Wigner function of ρABE reads
W (RABE) = N exp
(− 12 RABEV −1ABERTABE), (B8)
where RABE = (qA,pA,qB,pB,qE,pE) is the three-mode
quadrature vector. The covariance matrix can be easily
computed and reads
VABE = 12
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
C 0 S√η 0 S√1 − η 0
0 C 0 −S√η 0 −S√1 − η
S
√
η 0 Cη + (1 − η) 0 (C − 1)√η(1 − η) 0
0 −S√η 0 Cη + (1 − η) 0 (C − 1)√η(1 − η)
S
√
1 − η 0 (C − 1)√η(1 − η) 0 C(1 − η) + η 0
0 −S√1 − η 0 (C − 1)√η(1 − η) 0 C(1 − η) + η
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
,
(B9)
where C = 2N + 1 and S = 2√N (N + 1). From VABE we obtain the covariance matrix of the joint state of Alice and Bob,
VAB = 12
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
C 0 S√η 0
0 C 0 −S√η
S
√
η 0 Cη + (1 − η) 0
0 −S√η 0 Cη + (1 − η)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠, (B10)
and that of Eve and Bob,
VBE = 12
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
Cη + (1 − η) 0 (C − 1)√η(1 − η) 0
0 Cη + (1 − η) 0 (C − 1)√η(1 − η)
(C − 1)√η(1 − η) 0 C(1 − η) + η 0
0 (C − 1)√η(1 − η) 0 C(1 − η) + η
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠. (B11)
In the second phase of the protocol Bob makes a measurement described by the POVM elements x(s) (30). To simplify the
notation we drop the normalization factor and write
x(s)  PnB |βn(x,s)〉〈βn(x,s)|PnB. (B12)
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We compute Alice’s (not-normalized) conditional state:
ρnA(x,s) = TrB
[
InA ⊗ (s)x ρ⊗nAB
] (B13)
= TrB
[
InA ⊗ PnB |βn(x,s)〉〈βn(x,s)|PnB ρ⊗nAB
]
. (B14)
We apply the property of strong typicality, ‖PnB |βn(x,s)〉〈βn(x,s)|PnB − |βn(x,s)〉〈βn(x,s)|‖1  δ, to obtain, up to an
error smaller than δ in trace distance,
ρnA(x,s)  TrB
[
InA ⊗ |βn(x,s)〉〈βn(x,s)| ρ⊗nAB
] (B15)
=
n⊗
j=1
TrB
[
IA ⊗ |βj (x,s)〉〈βj (x,s)| ρAB
] (B16)
=
n⊗
j=1
ρAj (x,s). (B17)
Then the probability of the outcome “x” can be obtained as
p(x,s) = Tr[ρnA(x,s)].
In the Wigner function representation, the equation
ρAj (x,s) = TrB[IA ⊗ |βj (x,s)〉〈βj (x,s)| ρAB] reads
WAj (x,s)(RA) = (2π )n
∫
d2nRBWβj (x,s)(RB)WAB(RAB),
(B18)
where WAB(RAB) is the Wigner function of ρAB and
Wβj (x,s)(RB) is the Wigner function of the coherent state
|βj (x,s)〉. With a lengthly but straightforward calculation we
found that the Wigner function of ρAj (x,s) is also Gaussian
with covariance matrix
VAj (x,s) =
[ (1 − η)N
1 + ηN +
1
2
](1 0
0 1
)
. (B19)
From VAj (x,s) we can compute the von Neumann entropy
of the conditional states ρAj (x,s), which is S(ρAj (x,s)) =
g[(1 − η)N ′] with N ′ = N/(1 + ηN ).
By applying the same reasoning we compute the covariance
matrix of Eve’s conditional states ρEj (x,s):
VEj (x,s) =
[ (1 − η)N
1 + ηN +
1
2
](1 0
0 1
)
. (B20)
We also compute the mean ¯Rj = (q¯Ej ,p¯Ej ) and obtain
q¯Ej (x,s) =
N
√
η(1 − η)
1 + ηN
Re[βj (x,s)]√
2
, (B21)
p¯Ej (x,s) =
N
√
η(1 − η)
1 + ηN
Im[βj (x,s)]√
2
. (B22)
Notice that the mean is also a function of the mode label j
through the amplitude βj (x,s). We remark that Alice’s and
Eve’s conditional states have the same covariance matrix but
different mean.
3. Calculations for the security proof
From the form of the conditional state ρnE(x,s) =⊗n
j=1 ρ
n
Ej
(x,s) we can compute
Es
[
ρnE(x,s)
] = ρ⊗nE (B23)
(notice that, for how Bob’s measurement has been defined, the
expectation value over s equals the expectation value over x).
ρE is a Gaussian state with zero mean. Its covariance matrix
can be obtained directly from (B11) and reads
VE = 12
(
C(1 − η) + η 0
0 C(1 − η) + η
)
(B24)
=
[
(1 − η)N + 1
2
](1 0
0 1
)
. (B25)
That is, ρE is a thermal state with (1 − η)N mean photons,
whose entropy is S(ρ(1−η)N ) = g[(1 − η)N ]. We then obtain
2−n[g[(1−η)N]+δ] Pnρ Pnρ ρ⊗nE Pnρ 2−n[g[(1−η)N]−δ] Pnρ . (B26)
The spectral decomposition of ρE is as in Eq. (A4). Similarly,
the operator ρE ⊗ ρE is identical to its homologous analyzed
for the direct reconciliation protocol, with spectral decompo-
sition given in Eq. (A8).
We now consider the operator ρ2E = Es[ρEj (x,s) ⊗
ρEj (x,s)]. Using the results of Sec. B 2 we found that ρ2E
is a Gaussian state with zero mean and covariance matrix
V2E =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
(1 − η)N + 12 0 η(1 − η)NN ′ 0
0 (1 − η)N + 12 0 η(1 − η)NN ′
η(1 − η)NN ′ 0 (1 − η)N + 12 0
0 η(1 − η)NN ′ 0 (1 − η)N + 12
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠, (B27)
with N ′ = N/(1 + ηN ). From the covariance matrix V2E we compute the von Neumann entropy S(ρ2E) = g[(1 − η)N ′] +
g[(1 − η)N ′′], with N ′′ = N (1 + 2ηN )/(1 + ηN ). Finally, its spectral decomposition is
ρ2E = 1(1 − η)2N ′N ′′
∞∑
t,m=0
( (1 − η)N ′
(1 − η)N ′ + 1
)t( (1 − η)N ′′
(1 − η)N ′′ + 1
)m
|ψt,m〉〈ψt,m|, (B28)
with
|ψt,m〉 = 2 −t−m2
t∑
j=0
m∑
k=0
(
t
j
)(
m
k
)
(−1)k
√
(t + m − j − k)!
√
(j + k)! |t + m − j − k〉|j + k〉. (B29)
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Notice that |ψt,m〉 is a state with exactly  = t + m photons. It
follows that ρ2E commutes with ρE ⊗ ρE [see Eq. (A8)].
4. Active attack
An active Gaussian attack from the eavesdropper can be
modeled as a beam splitter that mixes the mode from Alice with
a mode from a two-mode entangled state. As shown in Fig. 6,
the eavesdropper Eve obtains both the modes of the two-mode
entangled state. In this setting, if Alice’s two-mode entangled
state has N mean photons per mode, and Eve’s two-mode
entangled state has NT mean photons per mode, then the joint
four-mode Gaussian state of Alice, Bob, and Eve has covari-
ance matrix
FIG. 6. (Color online) A scheme for an active Gaussian attack.
The beam splitter mixes Alice’s mode with one mode from an
entangled pair (denoted by the symbol “∞”). The eavesdropper Eve
obtains both the modes of the two-mode state.
VABEE′=12
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
C 0 S√η 0 S√1 − η 0 0 0
0 C 0 −S√η 0 −S√1 − η 0 0
S
√
η 0 CT (1 − η) + Cη 0 (C − CT )
√
η(1 − η) 0 −ST
√
1 − η 0
0 −S√η 0 CT (1 − η) + Cη 0 (C − CT )
√
η(1 − η) 0 ST
√
1 − η
S
√
1 − η 0 (C − CT )
√
η(1 − η) 0 C(1 − η) + CT η 0 ST η 0
0 −S√1 − η 0 (C − CT )
√
η(1 − η) 0 C(1 − η) + CT η 0 −ST η
0 0 −ST
√
1 − η 0 ST η 0 CT 0
0 0 0 ST
√
1 − η 0 −ST √η 0 CT
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
,
(B30)
where C = 2N + 1, S = 2√N (N + 1), and CT = 2NT + 1,
ST = 2
√
NT (NT + 1). We can use this covariance ma-
trix instead of (B9) and repeat the calculations done in
Secs. B 1–B 3 for the reverse reconciliation protocol. We obtain
χrr = g(N ) − g[(1 − η) ˜N], (B31)
with ˜N = N (1 + NT )/[1 + NT − (N − NT )η], and, for
N  1,NT ,
krr = g(NT ) + 2g[(1 − η)N + ηNT ] − g[(1 − η) ˜N] − g[ ˆN ],
(B32)
with ˆN = 2(1 − η)N + (1−η)+NT (2η2−1)
η
. Finally, in the limit
N → ∞ we obtain
rrr = χrr − krr = 1 + log
(
1
1 − η
)
− g(NT ). (B33)
APPENDIX C: FLUCTUATIONS OF THE MEAN
PHOTON NUMBER 〈〉
Let us consider the distribution π , with
π = 1(1 − η)N + 1
( (1 − η)N
(1 − η)N + 1
)
( + 1), (C1)
and a δ-typical type π˜ . The empirical entropy given by π˜ is
S = −
∞∑
=0
π˜ logπ. (C2)
For the δ-typical type we have small fluctuation of S around
its average, that is,
S = −
∞∑
=0
π˜ logπ +
∞∑
=0
π logπ ∈ [−cδ,cδ]. (C3)
From (C1) we obtain
S = log [(1 − η)N + 1] − log
( (1 − η)N
(1 − η)N + 1
)
〈〉π˜
−〈log ( + 1)〉π˜ , (C4)
which yields
S = − log
( (1 − η)N
(1 − η)N + 1
)
〈〉 − 〈log ( + 1)〉. (C5)
For N large enough we have
S  log e
[
〈〉
(1 − η)N −
〈〉
(1 − η)N + 1
]
, (C6)
where we have used the fact that 〈〉π˜ fluctuates about (1−η)N .
Finally we obtain
log e〈〉
(1 − η)N  [(1 − η)N + 1]S. (C7)
Since for N large enough β = log e(1−η)N , we have
β〈〉  [(1 − η)N + 1]S. (C8)
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